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ABSTRACT 
The  choice  of  decision  framework  used to set regulatory tolerance 
levels  for  hazardous  substances  can  be  divided  into  rigid  and 
flexible  tolerance levels.  Rigid decision frameworks include  zero 
that  fix  risk  levels  for  some  or  de  minimis 
subpopulation. 
and/or  highly 
tolerances 
The accelerating identification of highly sensitive 
exposed  individuals  and  the  division  of  the 
population  into  ever  smaller  subpopulations  at higher  risk  could 
prove  to  be  tremendously  burdensome  on  regulatory  systems, 
particularly  for  rigid  decision  frameworks.  Rigid  tolerance 
levels,  philosophically  based  on  "rights"  to  zero  or arbitrarily 
low  excess  risks  for  individuals,  do  not  contain  sufficient 
flexibility  to  account  for  small  high-risk  sUbpopulations. 
Furthermore,  the  equal  protection  for  all  such  groups  is  an 
illusion,  mainly  because  of  the  potentially  large  number  of  such 
subgroups  and  the relatively fixed regulatory resources.  Thus,  de 
minimis  regulation is seen  as  a  minimal  but inadequate  improvement 
over  zero  risk  regulation.  with  improved  measures  of  the 
heterogeneous  demand  for  risk  reduction  by  various  high-risk 
subpopulations,  augmented cost-benefit analyses leading to flexible 
tolEr2.nces  could  provide  a  richer  analytic  framework  for  more 
efficient regulatory decisions.  Additionally,  it may  be useful  to 
attempt  to  c2.tegorize  hazards  and  subpopulations  on  the  basis  of 
t he  ability to  self-protect. 
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"Policymakers  should  have  some  concern  for  any  small  group  of 
people exposed to very high risk,  even if the overall average risk 
is  low."  (1 ) 
"  few  would  feel  that  it  is  essential  to  protect  the  most 
sensitive  asthmatic  or  the  most  compromised  individual  with 
cardiovascular disease who  decides to exercise heavily on the most 
polluted day  of the year. ,,(2) 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
It has become  increasingly clear that estimation of exposure, 
as  a  component  of  the  risk  equation  (potency  multiplied  by 
exposure),  has  the  potential  to  dominate  risk  management.  The 
problem  arises  as  policymakers  are  presented  with  increasingly 
refined exposure profiles consisting of detailed characterization 
of  risk  to  high-risk  subpopulations.  Through  new  techniques  to 
estimate  "internal"  dose  and  more  precise  survey  estimates  of 
external  dose,  it is  possible  to  identify  with  greater  accuracy 
actual  individual  exposure.  This  development  has  policy 
implications  because  there  are  a  variety of different mechanisms 
to  incorporate  this  information  into  risk  policy.  The  two 
quotations above demonstrate the dilemma regulatory decision makers 
face  with  respect  to  this  information.  That  is,  policymakers 
should  be  concerned  for  small  high-risk subgroups  but  should  not 
overprotect  them  at  public  expense  or  as  a  sUbstitute  for 
individual  responsibility.  The  debate centers  on  the uncertainty 
as  to  what  constitutes sufficient  concern  or overprotection.  In 
the  absence  of  a  risk  management  framework  that  explicitly 4 
identifies  the  appropriate  amount  of  concern  or  overprotection, 
however,  the  convenient  approach  to  such  uncertainties  typically 
defaults  toward  overprotection,  compelling  managers  to  set 
tolerances based solely on the risk to the high-risk subpopulation. 
Indeed,  many  federal  laws explicitly require risk managers to 
establish  tolerances  based  on  high-risk  sUbpopulations.  For 
example,  "the Clean Air Act and the occupational Safety and Health 
Act  require  that  standards  be  set to protect  individuals  who  are 
highly susceptible to the particular agent  being  regulated ....  II(3) 
This  paper  takes  the  view  that,  for  risk managers  to  be  able  to 
make  responsible decisions,  decision  frameworks  should explicitly 
take into account differing effective demand  for risk reduction by 
different  high-risk  subgroups.  Much  of  the  melange  of  current 
decision  frameworks  used  in  the  federal  government  (such  as  the 
Delaney Amendment to the Pure Food,  Drug,  and Cosmetics Act and de 
minimis  types  of  regulation)  fail  to  discriminate  between 
population  subgroups  in  a  logically  consistent  manner.  By 
examining  the  underlying  philosophy  and  practical  effects  of 
several  accepted  frameworks  in current  use,  it will  be  seen  that 
there are  some  basic criteria that should be  used to discriminate 
between  high-risk  subgroup  demands  for  risk  protection.  First, 
however,  it will be useful to examine more carefully what is meant 
by  a  high-risk subpopulation. 
2.  HIGH-RISK  SUBPOPULATIONS 
A  high-risk  subpopulation  may  be  defined  as  any  subgroup  of 
the whole  population that is either highly exposed  (environmental 5 
predisposition)  or highly sensitive  (genetic predisposition)  to  a 
particular  hazard.  In  statistical  terms,  small,  high-risk 
subpopulations  form  the  tail  of  the  joint  exposure/sensitivity 
distribution of the whole  population. 
One  example  of  the  first  type  of high-risk  subpopulation  is 
the  Maximal  Individual  Risk  (MIR)  used  by  the  Environmental 
Protection Agency.  This  is,  according to  EPA  "an estimate of the 
upperbound  of  risk  based  on  conservative  assumptions,  such  as 
continuous  exposure  for  24  h~urs per day  for  70  years. ,,(4)  Another 
example  is the  population  of statistically defined  "eaters"  of  a 
particular hazardous  substance  in the  food  supply.  The  Food  and 
Drug  Administration  defines  eaters  as  those  people  who  have  been 
surveyed and  found to eat the product at least once during a  survey 
period;  typically,  3  or  14  days.  Longer  survey  periods  would 
therefore  define  a  larger fraction  of the population  as  de  facto 
eaters  but  would  also  necessarily  produce  lower  average  eater 
exposures.  Thus,  in  actuality,  the  population  of  so-called 
"noneaters"  represents a  mixture of both less frequent or sporadic 
consumers  of the  product  as  well  as  absolute  nonconsumers  of the 
product.  A  smaller,  high-risk  subgroup  of  eaters  are  so-called 
"heavy  eaters,"  typically  defined  as  persons  who  consume  in  the 
upper  90th  percentile  of  intake  of  eaters.  It is often  further 
assumed  that  heavy  eaters  or  "preferential  consumers"  eat  the 
hazardous  food  every day and never switch to a  food not containing 
the  SUbstance  (presumably  because  of  brand  loyalty)  for  at least 
half  their  lifetimes  or  longer.  (5)  In  fact,  these  "preferential 6 
consumers"  are yet another subdivision into a  smaller,  higher-risk 
subgroup  whose  exact  size  is difficult  to  estimate.  It is  such 
subgroups  toward  which  policy is frequently  directed. 
To  be  sure,  there  is  normally  significant  debate  as  to  the 
appropriate  subgroup  to  use  for  a  specific  hazard. (6)  The  debate 
for exposure to food substances,  for example,  may center around the 
appropriate  exposure  period  and  the  fraction  of  the  entire 
population  who  should  be  considered  at  risk;  whether  to  include 
noneaters  and  eaters with  heavy eaters.  The  exposure  debate does 
not necessarily end with the debate over the amount and time period 
of external  exposure,  however. 
Indeed,  apparent  intake  of  a 
ambient  concentration  of  a  hazard 
hazardous  substance  (e.g., 
in  air,  water,  and  food)  is 
increasingly  criticized  as  a  poor  indicator  of  true  biological 
exposure at the target tissue where toxicity occurs.  An  additional 
screen for populations at risk is identification of the "sensitive" 
subpopulation.  For  example,  internal  dose  (sometimes  called 
biologically effective dose)  is "the dose of the active form of the 
toxic agent at the level of the target cells.  ,,(7)  Differences among 
individuals  in  the  absorption,  distribution,  metabolism,  and 
elimination  of  toxic  agents  can  result  in  large  variations  of 
delivered  or  biologically  effective  dose  at  the  target  organ. 
Perhaps  more  significant still,  large variations in genetic codes 
among  individuals  can  result  in  large  relative  variations  of 
response to the same delivered dose.  Increasingly,  biomarkers are 
gradually  being  developed  and  recommended  as  better  biological 7 
measures  of  both  individual  exposure  and  response  to  hazards.  (8) 
with  such  further  development  and  use  of  pharmacokinetics(9) 
exposure  and  pharmacodynamic(10)  response  biomarkers ,  it will  be 
increasingly  tempting  to  further  identify  and  subdivide  ever 
smaller high-risk subpopulations.  (11) 
There  will  be  strong  incentives  to  increasingly  use  this 
information in policy decisions concerning tolerance setting.  That 
the development  of  information  on  the heterogeneity of popUlation 
exposure  and  response  is  important  is  not  in  question.  What  is 
problematical  is  how  this  information  is  used  in  decisions  for 
tolerance setting.  Exposure estimates for use in risk analysis may 
end  up  placing  stresses  on  fixed  tolerance  decision  rules  that 
could  be  similar  to  those  that  developed  earlier  in  analytical 
chemistry,  where  ever  smaller  trace  levels  of  more  and  more 
toxicants  were  ubiquitously  discovered  because  of  increasingly 
refined  detection  methods.  So  too  the  accelerating  micro-
identification  of  more  and  more  high(er)-risk  subpopulations  is 
likely to place unmanageable  stress on  slightly relaxed but still 
predominantly  fixed  tol~rance  levels.  That  is,  as  science 
improves,  regulatory  tolerances  creep  towards  greater  stringency 
and  away  from  an  "optimal"  tolerance level. 
3.  DECISION  FRAMEWORKS 
It  is  precisely  this  kind  of  question  that  any  risk-based 
decision  framework  must  be  able  to  handle.  currently  available 
decision  frameworks  responsible  for  producing  health  and  safety 8 
decisions  generate  either  rigid  or  flexible  safety  tolerances. 
Rigid  tolerance  decision  frameworks  include  zero  tolerance  (the 
Delaney  Amendment)  and  de  minimis  tolerances  (i. e.,  tolerance 
levels set at a  low  excess  risk level).  Rigid tolerance decision 
frameworks  typically establish  an  "acceptable"  level  of  risk  for 
a  broad  class  of  hazards  (e. g.,  10-
6  to  10-
5
).  For  individual 
hazards,  the decision is whether or not the particular hazard falls 
within  the  legal  definition  for  the  defined  class.  Flexible 
tolerance  decision  frameworks  include  more  liberally  interpreted 
de  minimis  tolerances  and  cost/benefit  analyses.  In  these 
frameworks,  each hazard may  have  a  separate tolerance established 
based  on  balancing the various characteristics of the hazard,  the 
population at risk and  costs of regulation. 
4.  DECISION  FRAMEWORKS  PRODUCING  RIGID  TOLERANCE  LEVELS 
The  two  decision  frameworks  producing rigid tolerance levels 
most  often  used  are  those  that  necessitate  zero  risk  levels  and 
~hose that  regulate  risk  to  fixed  low  excess  risk  or  de  minimis 
levels.  The  most  widely  known  zero  risk  law  is  the  Delaney 
Amendment to the Food,  Drug,  and cosmetic Act,  which specifies that 
"no  additive shall  be  deemed  'safe'  if it is  found ...  after tests 
that  are  appropriate  for  the  evaluation  of  the  safety  of  food 
additives to  induce  cancer  in man  or animals."  with  a  zero  risk 
standard,  no discrimination is possible for any subgroup,  including 
high-risk subgroups  as the product is eliminated  from  the market. 
In  fact,  support  for  the  Delaney  Amendment  came  in  part  from 9 
biomedical  researchers  who  said,  "Public  health policy  has  to  be 
based  on  protecting  the  most  susceptible  individuals,  which  the 
Clause tends to do. ,,(12)  Obviously,  the Clause overprotects everyone 
and  this type  of decision  framework  cannot  function  in the modern 
world  of  analytical  chemistry,  which  is  capable  of  detecting 
carcinogens  in  the  parts  per  trillion  range.  In  fact,  perhaps 
given  the  stringency  of  the  Clause  and  resulting  societal 
inefficiency,  the Delaney  Amendment  has  rarely been  invoked.  One 
such inefficiency,  slowing up the rate of additive development,  has 
been well  documented. (13) 
In  a  sense,  a  de  minimis  rule  that  incorporates  a  pre-set 
fixed risk level for a  class of hazards is an extension of the zero 
risk standard,  i.e.,  a  fixed risk at a  higher level.  A  de minimis 
risk is defined as one which is so small it is not worth the effort 
to regulate;  it is essentially a  legal concept that distinguishes 
between  trivial  and  nontrivial  risks.  Agencies  such  as  the  Food 
and Drug Administration and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have 
adopted an explicitly narrow approach to deciding de minimis levels 
based  only  on  toxicity  and  exposure  whereas  other  regulatory 
agencies  include  broader  considerations  such  as  the  size  of  the 
high-risk  subpopulation.  (14)  The  narrow  approach  to  de  minimis 
regulation has agencies setting single maximum lifetime risk levels 
(normally between 10-6  and  10-5)  for a  class of hazards and applying 
those risks to the sensitive or highly exposed populations. 
Like the Delaney Amendment,  the uncompromising nature of these 
de minimis decision frameworks is one of a  legislated absolute that 10 
is operatively equivalent to a  "rights-based" decision.  (15)  Rights-
based  approaches  have  become  central  to  many  political  debates 
involving issues such as the rights of criminals,  abortion rights, 
capital  punishment,  and  the  Pledge  of  Allegiance.  (16)  The  "right" 
in the case of hazards,  is an  "inalienable right"  not to be harmed 
by  the  actions  of  others  (by  a  manufacturer  or originator of  the 
hazard) . (17)  By  framing  such  problems  in terms  of rights,  there is 
no  room for situational discrimination.  For risk from hazards,  the 
problem  is  that  it  is  impossible  under  such  an  approach  to 
discriminate  with  respect  to  the  size  or  characteristics  of  the 
subpopulation  that  possesses  such  rights.  There  is  an  enormous 
difference,  for  example,  between the right of the U.S.  population 
to de minimis risk and the right of an  individual to face the same 
risk.  (18) 
Once  such  an  absolute  right  has  been  legislated,  the  right 
becomes  the  policy,  and  balance  against  competing  but  non-
legislated rights becomes  largely irrelevant.  The  effect of  such 
an  approach  to  the  regulation  of  hazards  is  to  transfer  policy 
decisions  into  a  purely  zero  sum  decision  in which  "single  issue 
proponents  can  withstand  the  collapse  of  the  heavens  as  long  as 
their  interest  is  served. n(19)  Notwithstanding  the  lamentable 
transfer of legitimate social debate  from  the politics of balance 
and persuasion to the politics of rights,  (19)  there is some question 
if any  group  should  possess  an  inalienable right to be  protected 
from hazards.  When  the hazard may be traced directly or indirectly 
to  a  pollutant  or  other  risk  generated  in  the  manufacturing 11 
process,  the  right not  to  be  harmed  would  perhaps  arise if it is 
presumed that a  manufacturer has  a  moral  responsibility to prevent 
harm  to  buyers  because  they  (the  manufacturers)  are  in  "informed 
control"  (over consumers) . (20)  Informed control is defined to exist 
when  manufacturers  know  the  inherent  risks  in  the  products  they 
sell but  buyers  are  ignorant  of  those  risks.  When  this  is true, 
manufacturers are said to have a  moral responsibility to remove all 
risks from their products and,  by extension,  government must ensure 
that they  do  so.  (21) 
First,  because costs are generally borne  in some  part by all 
of society,  as well as manufacturers,  there is some  question as to 
whether  any  individual  has  an  absolute  right  to  impose  costs  on 
others.  Furthermore,  for  many  types  of hazards,  the  risk may  be 
at  least partially  self-inflicted.(~)  Presumably,  to  the  extent 
that a  consumer knows  about the risk prior to incurring it, he has 
given tacit consent to its existence and has willingly participated 
in  incurring  that  risk.  It  would  be  difficult  to  argue,  for 
example,  that persons  who  started  smoking  cigarettes  in the  last 
five  years  are  not  partially  culpable  in  inflicting  risk  on 
themselves.  Thus,  individuals  are  implicitly  "willing 
participants"  in  incurring  risk  if  (1)  individuals  are  informed 
about the nature of the hazard and the risk involved and,  (2)  once 
informed,  are  capable  of  reducing  risk  to  an  individually 
acceptable level.  This claim to a  right may  even be attenuated to 
the  extent  that  there  is  the  possibility  of  becoming  informed. 
For  example,  if  products  are  labeled  with  respect  to  pesticide 12 
toxicity,  then  an  individual  consuming  those  products  bears  some 
responsibility  for  the  risk  incurred.  Furthermore,  it  is  not 
enough  to note that no  self-protection activity has  been  taken  on 
the part of the  consumer.  For  example,  a  consumer  living next to 
a  power plant has  the option to move.(n)  Thus,  the very nature of 
willing participation creates a  strong denial of a  claim to a  right 
to  risk protection  and  at least partially absolves  manufacturers 
of the responsibility to reduce  or eliminate risk.  Whether  or 
not such legitimate rights exist,  a  rigidly interpreted de minimis 
risk  framework  has  the  potential  to  enormously  disrupt  economic 
markets.  wi  th  more  higher  risks  and  smaller  subgroups  being 
identified at risk  (through  the  use  of  biomarkers,  for  example), 
it  will  become  more  expensive  to  regulate  for  these  groups  by 
provision  of  absolute  protection via  inalienable  rights.  By  not 
considering  the  size  of  the  subgroup  to  be  protected,  fixed 
tolerance  decision  structures  create  the  potential  for  enormous 
social  costs  because  "a  myriad  of  society's  essential activities 
would  have to cease"  (because of excessive cost) .(~) 
Furthermore,  not  only  are  there  potentially large  costs  but 
the  benefits  and  costs  would  potentially  become  more  inequitably 
skewed  as  smaller  groups  become  the  target population  for  fixed-
risk regulation.  If only a  small  fraction of people are protected 
to  10-6 ,  for  example,  yet  everyone  must  pay  for  the  regulatory 
effort through taxes  (or higher prices for some),  the distribution 
of  costs  and  risk-reducing  benefits  will  tend  toward  greater 
inequity if few  products are regulated.  This  inequity may  not be 13 
perceived if,  for example,  the public believes that all risks have 
been  or are being  regulated to de  minimis  levels. 
stated otherwise,  if all risks could be  regulated to  a  fixed 
level  such as  10-6  (lifetime risk),  then presumably everyone would 
enjoy the same  low level of risk.  However,  the use of a  fixed-risk 
level for the most sensitive or most highly exposed group does  not 
necessarily produce equitable social benefits  (risk reduction)  for 
all parties.  The  problem is that with relatively fixed regulatory 
resources,  it is not possible to pass regulations for every small, 
well-defined  subgroup.  Furthermore,  depending  on  the  method  of 
prioritizing issues, whether deliberate or ad hoc,  the distribution 
of regulatory payoffs  (risk-reducing regulation)  may be skewed and, 
in extreme  cases,  may  appear  lottery-like with very large payoffs 
going  to  very  small  groups.  This  lottery-like  distribution  of 
payoffs will occur as more high-risk subgroups are defined through 
product, activity, geographical,  or exposure subdivision.  In fact, 
to protect an even larger fraction of such groups at current fixed-
risk levels, there would seemingly have to be a  tremendous increase 
in  the  rate  at  which  regulations  are  passed,  and  the  required 
increase  in  the  budget  for  health  and  safety  regulations  seems 
unlikely.  (25) 14 
5.  FLEXIBLE  TOLERANCE  DECISION  FRAMEWORKS 
Decision  frameworks  that  produce  tolerance  levels  that  vary 
from  decision  to  decision  include  flexible  de  minimis  and  cost-
benefit  frameworks.  The  former  seeks  to  improve  on  rigid  de 
minimis  frameworks  by  recognizing  that  IIwe  cannot  have  simple 
definitions of significant or de minimis risk because acceptability 
depends  on  lithe  consequences  of  the  effect,  whether  the  risk  is 
undertaken  voluntarily,  which  population  is  at  risk,  and  so 
forth. II (  26) 
In a  flexible de minimis decision framework,  the level of risk 
considered  de  minimis  may  vary  depending  on  a  wide  variety  of 
attributes of the hazard or exposed population although, generally, 
benefi  ts  are  not  considered.  (27)  For  example,  ad  hoc  suggestions 
for dealing with the size of the exposed population have been made 
such  as  defining  a  de  minimis  risk  as  IIless  than  10-5  per  year 
(probability of death)  for  a  population of  103,  less than  10-6  per 
year for exposed populations of 103  to 106 ,  and 10-7  per year for the 
entire  population.  11(28)  In  fact,  others  have  stated  that  a 
regulation  should  not  be  considered:  IIFor  example,  if there  were 
an  occupational  group  of  10  or  fewer  or  a  population  of  100  or 
fewer,  these  populations  would  simply  be  too  small  to  warrant 
agency attention.  11(29) 
Alternatively,  the cost/benefit analysis allows  for  flexible 
tolerances based on all regulatory criteria.  The benefit/cost test 
arises out of economic  theory in which  a  regulatory policy option 
is deemed  appropriate  if a  IIpotential  Paretoll(~)  improvement  will 15 
obtain,  i'. e.,  the  gains  from  a  particular  regulation  could  be 
distributed in such  a  manner  so as to make all persons at least as 
well off as they were before the regulation.  (31)  That is,  one group 
benefits,  another group  incurs costs,  and,  at least in principle, 
the  gains  in benefits  outweigh  costs  such  that the  gainers  could 
compensate the losers.  Costs of various options are calculated as 
opportunity costs,  i.e., the loss of the next best alternative use 
of  resources.  Health  benefits  (to  gainers)  are  reduced  risk  of 
illness or injury.  The option selected is that which generates the 
largest difference  in benefits  and  costs. 
In neoclassical  economic  theory,  consumers  value  a  reduction 
in  risk,  that  is,  reduction  of  risk  has  positive  utility  to 
consumers.  All  individuals are  assumed  to be utility maximizers, 
which  means  that  they  are  able  to  make  rational  choices  with 
respect that payments  to  reduce  risk.  Because  people  do  in  fact 
make  risk/dollar choices all the  time,  proponents  of this theory 
hold  that  the  choices  made  by  the  government  to  intervene  in 
markets to reduce risk should be consistent with the choices people 
make  for  themselves. 
Linking the decision as  to the  amount  of risk that should be 
reduced  to  the  measurement  of  actual  choices  is  philosophically 
based  on the  "consent"  of the affected parties.  (32)  By  taking cues 
from  trade-offs  that  consumers  make,  the  consent  approach  is 
diametrically opposed to the  (inalienable)  rights-based approach, 
which  does  not  recognize  such  trade-offs.  With  consent-type 
decision  analysis,  either measured  (hypothetical,  estimated  from 16 
market  actions)  or  actual  (voting)  consent  (which  contains 
estimates  of  payments  to  accept  or  reduce  risk)  is  obtained  from 
the  affected  parties.  The  hypothetical  or  market  approach,  for 
example,  scrutinizes the amount or money required to induce workers 
to  accept  a  riskier  job  or  monetizes  the  value  of  time  spent  by 
consumers  to  put  on  seat  belts.  Normalizing  these  monetized 
amounts  for  100%  risk reduction  is often said  (incorrectly)  to be 
an  implied valuation of life.(ll) 
However,  as currently practiced,  cost/benefit analysis often 
treats  risk  to  all  individuals  as  homogeneous  by  summing  the 
benefits expected to occur as  a  result of preventing  a  number  of 
illnesses,  injuries  and/or  deaths.  In  general,  neither  the 
characteristics  of  a  hazard  nor  the  types  of  individual  are  used 
to alter valuations  placed  on  morbidity  or mortality.  Thus,  for 
example,  a  reduction of risk from certain death to a  90%  chance of 
death would  be treated as  equal to  a  reduction of risk from  a  20% 
chance of death to 10%.  Failure to consider heterogeneous risk and 
individuals  at  risk treats  the  benefits  of  risk  reduction  for  a 
high-risk  subpopu1ation  as  equivalent  to  an  equal  amount  of  risk 
reduction for a  large group with low risk. 
levels  of  risk  being  valued  differently, 
Besides the problem of 
there  may  be  other 
characteristics of the hazard and  the exposed population that may 
cause the benefits of risk reduction to be  valued  differently.(~) 
For  example,  the  decision  as  to  whether  or  not  a  healthy  adult 
invests  the  time  to  put  on  a  seat  belt  seems  to  have  little 
relevance to the decision of whether or not to lower the risk from 17 
ingestion  of  lead  by  children.  (35)  Much  work  has  been  done,  that 
shows  there  is  a  positive  discount  rate  for  health  effects  that 
occur  in  the  future. (36)  This  implies  differential  valuations 
depending  on  when  in  the  future  the  health  effect  is  likely  to 
occur. 
In fact,  research has shown that consumers do have an eclectic 
demand  for  risk  reduction  which  may  justify  attempts  to  protect 
sensitive subgroups. (37)  It has  been  shown that,  for  example,  if a 
hazard  is  involuntary,  has  its effect primarily  on  children,  and 
is unfamiliar  (such as cancer),  consumers appear to place a  greater 
weight  on  reducing these types of risks.  (38)  Thus,  if risk is used 
in  a  generic  sense  such  that the  types  of  hazards  to the  exposed 
population  are weighted  equally  by  using  a  consensus  mean  demand 
estimate,  the  "consent"  obtained  in indirect measurements  may  not 
be  a  good  indicator of true  consent  by  the affected parties.  It 
is doubtful  that  a  conscientious  policymaker  could,  in  fact,  use 
such  an  estimate. 
Yet  another problem with cost/benefit analysis  is that it is 
not  at  all  clear  who  the  affected  parties  are,  that  is,  whose 
demand  for  risk  reduction  should  be  counted.  (39)  Direct 
beneficiaries of risk-reducing regulations for high-risk subgroups 
include  both  the  subgroup  itself and  to  the  rest  of  the  exposed 
population  at  lower  risk.  But  there  are  also  indirect  benefits 
accruing both to altruistic members of society as well as those who 
view  their  "vote"  for  such  a  regulation  as  part  of  a  policy  of 
protecting  subgroups  that  may  ul  timately  directly  affect 18 
themselves.  On  the latter point,  consumers  need not be altruistic 
to  favor  risk  reduction  for  others  if  they  view  the  policy  of 
reducing  risk to  high-risk  subpopulations  as  a  type  of  insurance 
that  would  be  forthcoming  were  they  themselves  ever  in  such  a 
subgroup.  This may be an explanation for some observed altruism.  (40) 
An  altruistic vote,  then,  may  actually reflect a  wish  on  the part 
of some members of society to ensure protection  (reduction in risk) 
should they ever be  identified as  a  part of  a  high-risk subgroup, 
similar to  an  "option"  value  for  a  park.  (41)  However,  for  such  a 
value,  no  guarantee exists because there are too  few  resources to 
research  and  protect  every  well  defined  high-risk  subgroup.  In 
this case,  indirect benefits from  an option value would be largely 
illusory. 
Thus,  to  apply  cost/benefit  analysis  to  risk  decisions 
affecting high-risk  subpopulations  that  have  been  identified,  it 
will  be  necessary  to  more  accurately measure  the  demand  for  risk 
reduction  for  both  the  subgroup  and  altruistic  individuals. 
Although each situation is unique,  in a  practical sense it will be 
necessary  to  categorize  types  of  individuals  and  hazards  to 
estimate  demand  for  risk reduction.  For  example,  a  key  variable 
that  should  be  used  to  characterize  such  groups  would  be  the 
possibility  of  self-protection.  (42)  This  would,  for  example, 
differentiate children and  functional  adults. 
The  use  of  the  ability to  self-protect  as  a  discriminatory 
variable  may  lead  to  a  policy  option,  under  the  consent  type  of 
approach of information provision, of either taking self-protective 19 
measures or making  individual  (optimal)  risk choices.  This policy 
option  could be  compared with  more  stringent regulatory measures. 
For  instance,  in  a  past  case  confronting  the  Occupationtional 
Safety and  Health Administration  (OSHA),  "OSHA  (had)  available 
a  means  of protecting sensitive individuals  not available to 
EPA  •  .  whereby  medical  surveillance of  workers  is possible to 
detect  the  early  stages  of  a  disease,  and  workers  can  be  removed 
from areas of exposure  (for cotton dust) . ,,(43)  The smaller and more 
identifiable the group,  the less complicated the  information,  and 
the more voluntary the nature of the risk,  the greater are the net 
benefits of  information provision,  compared  to those  of tolerance 
setting.  By  allowing the possibility of self-protection,  possibly 
enhanced  by  information  provision,  the  dilemma  of  increasingly 
stringent  regulation  resulting  from  increased  identification  of 
ever smaller subgroups  is largely avoided. 
6.  SUMMARY 
The accelerating identification of either.highly sensitive or 
highly  exposed  individuals  and  their  division  into  ever  smaller 
subpopulations at higher risk could potentially prove tremendously 
burdensome  on  regulatory  systems,  depending  on  the  particular 
decision  framework  used  for  hazardous  situations.  Current  risk-
decision  frameworks  used to regulate risk include rigid tolerance 
decision  frameworks  with  zero  or de  minimis  tolerance  levels  and 
those  producing  flexible  tolerance  levels,  de  minimis  or 
cost/benefit  analysis.  Rigid  tolerance  levels,  philosophically 20 
based  on  rights  to  zero  or  arbitrarily  low  excess  risks,  do  not 
contain  sufficient  flexibility  to  account  for  small  high-risk 
subpopulations.  These  decision  frameworks  imply  equal  absolute 
minimum  protection for all such  groups  -- an  illusion largely due 
to the potentially large  number  of  such  groups -- with relatively 
fixed  regulatory resources. 
with  improved  measures  of  the  heterogeneous  demand  for  risk 
reduction  by  various  high-risk  subpopulations,  cost-benefit 
analysis  could  provide  a  richer  analytic  framework  for  more 
efficient regulatory decisions.  It may  be  useful  to  attempt  to 
categorize hazards  and  subpopulations  on  the basis of the ability 
to  self-protect  and  to  discriminately  measure  demand  for  risk 
reduction more precisely.  Such efforts should help to improve the 
political acceptability of cost/benefit analysis. 21 
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